Grim’s annihilation of the Fog of War

The ultimatus in strategy for Iraq and the Long War.

The Myth of the Guerrilla is not new. The use of global media to convince the world of the truth of the myth is not new — the Tet Offensive is the model here. What is new is the global scale of the conflict. Al Qaeda and its allies can create momentum in rural Afghanistan, and thereby humiliate the Coalition. It appears to be more powerful than America, more powerful than NATO, because it can defy their will and exert control where we cannot. That control is based on the careful application of a small amount of strength; the worldwide appearance of power is based on the global media carrying today’s one small success to every household with a television. Even if every household in Afghanistan but one sleeps safely tonight, that one is all that is needed to portray the insurgency as unstoppable, and capable of exerting its will when and where it pleases.

It is not, of course: it would rather strike the White House than a farmhouse in Afghanistan. But we cannot stop the one attack in Afghanistan, and therefore the insurgency is winning. Its goal is to attack, ours to defend, and since it has attacked somewhere, that is enough. Readers of newspapers see an example of their strength, that small but carefully applied strength, each and every day. It becomes an article of faith.

Now consider the example of Fallujah, where this played out in a larger arena. In Fallujah, the enemy convinced a hostile population that it could lead them to victory. As a consequence, the people of Fallujah gave themselves over to the leadership of Islamists, trained with them, and believed them when they said that the Marine Corps would be buried there.

This, too, was an illusion. When the Marines and US Cavalry came, the terrorist leadership fled. The people of Fallujah who had chosen to believe the myth were left to fight alone, and fight they did — hard, and according to the Fallujah veterans I’ve talked to, with a deep determination. In the end, however, they did not survive. Between the second battle of Fallujah and Iraq’s elections, terrorist attacks fell forty percent. The elections came off almost without a hitch even there, in what had been the heart of enemy country.

This was an occasion when our actions unmade the enemy’s information strategy. There still remained Sunni insurgents — their local problems remained in need of a solution — but al Qaeda in Iraq’s fall from popularity began there. Sunni tribes have increasingly turned against al Qaeda and Islamism, as Bill Roggio has journaled.

Defeating the enemy requires breaking its myths. But its myths can be made anywhere, in any village, in any house. We can break their hold on Fallujah, and when they become rooted in a place, we must break their hold on it. But is there a way to keep them from rooting in the first place?

II. Disaggregation

This brings us to Disaggregation. This is not a new military concept, in spite of having a new name: we used to call it “Divide and Conqueor.” The main difference is that, now, we have no interest in conquest. We do, however, need to concentrate on dividing the terrorists from local insurgents.

In other words, we need to prevent them from winning over a people like the people of Fallujah. We need to keep the Sunni insurgent separate from the al Qaeda terrorist, so that we have a Sunni problem here and a Taliban problem there, rather than a global insurgency all working together and sharing expertise.

The original article discusses this:

You must read this, even if you don’t understand exactly how military strategy, logistics, and tactics work together. Btw, this addendum that was cross-linked in Grim’s post is also worth a direct read, just in case you forget. I made a comment at that post, quoted below.

Btw, Grim, you mentioned the Illiad as heroic epics. I’ve seen some depictions of the Odyssey and/or the Illiad, but it didn’t translate. Meaning, it didn’t come across as epic. It came across as an average adventure. I didn’t read it in the original Homerian language nor even a translated works. My interests were more concerned with philosophy, thus Aristotle and his Nicomachean Ethics.

If you want to know how to deal with an Iraqi sheikh, you need to learn to think of yourself as Menelaeus, Lord of the Warcry: a study of the Iliad (and I do recommend the Fitzgerald translation) will teach you a great deal about honor, shame, the great violence they can spawn, and how to make amends.

Not to say it isn’t useful. But let’s just say that they seem to be pieces. I think a good comprehensive translation of the epic was the Gates of Fire I first heard from Michael Yon through LTC Kurilla.

The themes of defending your home, honor, discipline, comraderie, the courage of kings, and the loyalty of his followers. As well as the courage of men and women, and how they differ.

It is a very easy read, and I think, something that would speak to an American directly. Or at least a Marine, because I tend to think they focus much on the Spartans and on Thermopylae. I believe I first heard about Thermopylae and the Spartans through SM Stirling and his co-author in the Prince of Sparta series.

Gates of Fire AN EPIC NOVEL OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLAE

Epic, indeed.

Tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, that here obedient to their laws we lie.

The Western tradition is deep. Deep enough even for a modern word to evolve out of a name for a people.
Ymarsakar | Homepage | 01.05.07 – 1:18 am | #

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